

raids. Skilled Bidai, Akokisa, and Deadose horsemen and riflemen chose to leave Mission San Ildefonso, taking their families with them, when they were exhorted by an allied confederacy of Ais, Hasinai, Kadohadachos, Nabadaches, Yojuanes, Tawakonis, Yatahis, Kichais, Naconis, and Tonkawas to join a general campaign against Apaches. Despite promises to return in two months, the warriors and their families remained absent almost eighteen months while the men's military commitments took precedence over settlement ones.⁴⁹

When the Indians of south-central Texas agreed to cast their lot with Spaniards in joint mission settlements, Spanish officials and missionaries alike often portrayed them as men who checked their valor at the mission door. The idea of missions as institutions through which to "conquer," "subdue," "pacify," and "subjugate" Indians was so firmly locked in their imaginations that they refused to acknowledge the reality of their situation. Despite such stereotypes (more often found at higher levels of administration), in day-to-day life the warriors at the San Antonio missions were crucial to the defense of the mission-presidio complexes, and the Spaniards knew it. In a 1744 letter to Viceroy conde de Fuenclara, Governor Tomás Felipe Winthuysen praised the Indian men at Valero, describing them as "among the most warlike and skillful in shooting arrows." As a member of the 1766–68 Rubí inspection team sent to evaluate defensive capabilities across the northern provinces, Nicolás de Lafora argued that presidial guards stationed at the San Antonio missions were unnecessary because the one hundred "bow and arrow men" living there put the missions "beyond reach of any local or outside attack." When Hugo O'Connor, the commandant inspector of presidios for the northern frontier, requested assessments of the province of Texas's capability to muster forces against a feared invasion by allied Wichitas and Comanches in the 1770s, three different military officials—Rafael Martínez Pacheco (twenty-year veteran and commandant of the El Orcoquisac presidio), Luis Antonio Menchaca (thirty-year veteran and commandant of the Béxar presidio), and Roque de Medina (adjutant-inspector of the interior presidios)—all counted mission Indian warriors as critical components of the "forces of the province." O'Connor responded with directives that Indian men at the five San Antonio missions receive 132 pounds of gunpowder, the same provisions allocated to the Béxar presidial company.⁵⁰

Although the necessities of daily life kept Spaniards and Indians alike focused on subsistence and defense and ensured the continued value of native-defined divisions of labor, another potential arena for conflict between Spanish and Indian communal patterns emerged from Franciscan efforts to use the mission settlements to achieve the social "civilization" of Indian residents. Their attempted reforms cen-